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Abstract
We study rmsadoption of exible versus dedicated technologies in
the context of a mixed versus a private duopoly with product di¤eren-
tiation. The exible technology allows a rm to become multiproduct
or multimarket without bearing additional costs. We nd that a con-
guration where both rms adopt exible technologies is more likely
to arise in equilibrium in the private duopoly. A similar result oc-
curs when both rms use a dedicated technology in the case of either
almost independent products or products that are close substitutes.
Privatization of the public rm is socially benecial only in limited
circumstances.
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1 Introduction
In the recent past, many rms all over the world have substituted their tradi-
tional production processes by more exible systems. One of the advantages
of a exible manufacturing system (FMS) over a dedicated equipment (DE)
is that the former allows a rm to supply several products and consequently
to participate in di¤erent markets (in other words, becoming a multiproduct
or multimarket rm1) without having to incur additional production costs.2
The following two examples serve as motivation for the analysis we
present. First, consider the internet access, telephone and TV services.
Traditionally the provision of these services required the use of di¤erent
technologies and separate production processes for each one of them. At
present though, cable technology can be used by rms in order to provide
these three di¤erent services using the same production process, therefore
enabling rms to be present in all three markets and to exploit economies
of scope. In that sense, cable technology can be considered an example of
FMS.3 Interestingly, the matter has raised public concern. In the UK reg-
ulators have encouraged cable companies to provide telephone services but
did not allowed British Telecom to enter the television business (Waverman
and Sirel, 1997). Similarly, Spanish Telefonica was not permitted to com-
pete with cable operators for a certain period of time (Cantos-Sánchez et
al., 2003).
The second example draws from the health care sector. There is evidence
of economies of scope (Ozcan et al., 1992), which can be related to the use of
FMS. There are several empirical studies stressing the fact that public (not
for-prot) hospitals provide a wider range of services than private (for-prot)
hospitals (Shortell and Morrison, 1986, 1987 and Schlesinger et al., 1997)
1This represents an alternative interpretation of our model.
2Boyer and Moreaux (1997, 2002) report additional benets of using FMS related to
capacity exibility in that FMS can increase the capacity of rms to adapt to uctuations
in demand.
3Dial-up internet access can also be provided using traditional telephone technology.
In that sense, traditional telephone technology could also be seen as a exible technology,
since it can be used to service two markets: telephone and internet access services. How-
ever, cable technology also allows rms to provide TV services, which cannot be provided
by using traditional telephone technology.
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although public hospitals tend to provide more innovative services without
competition and private hospitals are more likely to add these services when
there is competition (Schlesinger, 1998). This body of observations suggest
that not only the public or private character of rms but also the degree of
competition among them seem to be key factors inuencing the adoption of
FMS (thus, the multiproduct/multimarket character of rms).
The study of the adoption of FMS by private rms was rst introduced by
Röller and Tombak (1990) and Kim, Röller and Tombak (1992), in the con-
text of oligopolistic competition. Their ndings indicate that the adoption
of exible technologies requires a su¢ ciently low adoption cost, su¢ ciently
high product di¤erentiation and large enough markets.4 Consumers bene-
t from the use of FMS, due to the increase in competition.5 In addition,
Röller and Tombak (1993) validate these results by an empirical study.6 To
the best of our knowledge, the issue of technology choice as exemplied by
the adoption of FMS versus DE technologies has not been studied in the
context of a mixed market where private (prot-maximising) rms co-exist
with public (not-for-prot) ones. Such mixed markets are quite prevalent
in transition economies but not exclusively so; telecommunications, health
services and the postal sector in many countries are organized as a mixed
market.
The aim of this paper is to provide an initial analysis into the choice of
production exibility by concentrating on a simple duopolistic market con-
sisting of either a public and a private rm (mixed duopoly) or two private
rms. In particular, we characterize the market conditions that would lead
the public and private rms to adopt FMS as opposed to DE. A natural
question to address in this context relates to the potential benets of priva-
tizing the public rm. This is of practical and policy relevance in the light
4Garcia-Gallego and Georgantzis (1996) use a similar model to assess multiproduct
activity in relation to competition policy.
5See also Gupta (1998) for some corrections and reinterpretations of the results in
Röller and Tombak (1990).
6Eaton and Schmitt (1994), in the context of horizontal product di¤erentiation, point
out that the adoption of FMS may correspond to pre-emptive strategies leading to higher
levels of concentration.
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of recent liberalization trends in many countries across the world. Interest-
ingly, we nd that privatization is socially benecial only when both rms in
the mixed duopoly adopt FMS and products are su¢ ciently di¤erentiated.
The plan of the paper is as follows: rst, we introduce the model (section
2) and then characterize the di¤erent equilibria (section 3). Next we analyze
the behavior of rms in the mixed and private duopolies and consider social
welfare and the question of privatization (section 4). Finally we summarize
our main ndings (section 5).
2 The Model
Our model keeps the main features from Röller and Tombak (1990) and
Kim, Röller and Tombak (1992) but allows for decreasing returns to scale.7
Consider a duopoly competing in output and facing the choice between
adopting a exible manufacturing system (FMS) and a dedicated equipment
(DE). The use of FMS allows participation in two existing markets, A and B.
The use of the DE constraints rms to be active only in one of the markets.
In the case of the mixed duopoly, one of the two rms, denoted by the
subscript 2, is public (non-for-prot) and acts as social-welfare maximizer.8
The system of inverse demand functions is given by:
PA = a QA   QB (1)
and
PB = a QB   QA (2)
where PA and PB are the prices for products A and B respectively, QA and
QB the total quantities in market A and market B respectively and a > 0
7This assumption is widely spread in the literature on mixed oligopoly, and is useful in
order to avoid the case of natural monopolies which, considering the scope of our paper,
is uninteresting.
8The assumption about social welfare maximization is in line with the majority of the
literature on mixed oligopoly. An alternative, not pursued here, is provided by Matsumura
(1998): partially privatized rms are assumed to combine the maximization of social
welfare with the maximization of prots.
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measures market potential. The parameter  measures the substitutability
of products A and B,  2 [0; 1), the higher  the ercer the competition
between rms across markets.
The prot of each rm is given by:
i;j = P
AQAi;j + P
BQBi;j   Fk   Ci(QAi;j +QBi;j) (3)
where i denotes the rm (i = 1 or 2) and j denotes the state of the industry
according to the technologies used by the two rms. In particular,
j = 1 if both rms are using FMS;
j = 2 if rm 1 is using DE and rm 2 is using FMS;
j = 3 if rm 1 is using FMS and rm 2 is using DE;
j = 4 if both rms are using DE.
QAi;j and Q
B
i;j are the quantities chosen by rm i in state j for markets
A and B respectively. Without loss of generality, we assume that if only
one rm is using DE, this rm competes only in market A while the other
rm participates in both markets. If both rms use DE, they compete in
di¤erent markets (without loss of generality, rm 1 in market A and rm 2
in market B). Thus, the use of FMS increases the degree of competition not
only in the market where a rm is operating but also across markets (due
to product substitutability).
Fk are the xed costs of rms, which are related to the use of the available
manufacturing technologies; k = FMS or DE. The costs of using FMS are
assumed higher than the costs of using a DE.9 For simplicity, we normalize
the costs of the dedicated technology to FDE = 1. The costs of the exible
technology are then FFMS = 1 + s, where s captures the extent of the cost
di¤erential between the two manufacturing technologies. Ci are the costs of
production, which are assumed to be quadratic and separable in output
Ci(Q
A
i;j +Q
B
i;j) = (Q
A
i;j)
2 + (QBi;j)
2: (4)
Total Surplus (TS) is the sum of consumerssurplus (CS) and producers
9Developments costs are higher for FMS than DE; see Jaikumar (1986).
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prots. Linear demand functions yield
CS =
1
2
((QA)2 + (QB)2): (5)
Thus, TS is given by
TS = CS +
2X
i=1
i;j : (6)
We consider two versions of a two-stage game: (i) a private duopoly
and (ii) a mixed duopoly. In the rst stage rms choose which technology
to adopt and in the second stage they set quantity (Cournot). Decisions
in each stage are taken simultaneously. Given technology choices made
in stage one, it is straightforward to solve the output stage. 10 We can
then derive the relevant payo¤ functions (i;j) that rms use in solving the
rst stage. In other words, we use subgame perfection as our equilibrium
concept. In the appendix,11 we give the second-stage solutions for prots
(and total surplus). We can then represent the technology choice stage using
this simple matrix:
Firm 2
FMS DE
Firm 1 FMS 1;1 ; 2;1 1;3 ; 2;3
DE 1;2 ; 2;2 1;4 ; 2;4
Table 112
3 Equilibria Characterization
In this section we establish the conditions under which each of the combina-
tion of strategies in technology choice is a Nash equilibrium. We proceed by
10Second-order conditions are satised in all cases.
11Second-order conditions are satised in all cases.
12 In the private duopoly, Table 1 is symmetric since 1;1 = 2;1, 1;4 = 2;4,
1;3 = 2;2 and 1;2 = 2;3.
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nding the critical value of the technology costs, s; above which investment
in FMS becomes unprotable. Using Table 1, we examine the conditions
that guarantee one of the four possible pure-strategy equilibria in each of
the regimes, private or mixed duopoly: (FMS, FMS) where both rms choose
a exible production technology and serve both markets, (DE, DE) where
both rms choose a dedicated production process and serve di¤erent mar-
kets and (FMS, DE), (DE, FMS) where one rm chooses FMS and the other
DE.
3.1 The (FMS,FMS) Equilibrium
Private Duopoly. From Table 1, it is clear that (FMS, FMS) is an
equilibrium when (i) 1;1   1;2  0 for rm 1 and (ii) 2;1   2;3  0 for
rm 2. Using the model outlined previously, these conditions are equivalent
to:
a2(3 + 2)
(4 + 3)2
  3a
2(22 +    6)2
2(24  112)2   s  0:
Let 1 denote the critical level in (the di¤erence in) xed costs s; that
makes the above expression a strict equality. If s is lower than this critical
value 1 then both rms will choose FMS as it improves their prots. From
the above expression this critical value is,
1 =
a2f1()
2(4 + 3)2(24  112)2 (7)
where f1() = 1728 + 288   21722   3243 + 8674 + 885   1086 > 0.
Note that the critical value is increasing in market size, @1=@a > 0, while
it is decreasing in product substitutability, @1=@ < 0. The larger market
for either product makes rms wish to participate in exible production in
order to serve both markets. With a low degree of substitutability (small )
rmsproducts are perceived as highly di¤erentiated by consumers so that a
rm that opts for a dedicated production process (DE) and thus serves only
one market e¤ectively looses out. Hence a larger market size and greater
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product di¤erentiation point towards the adoption of FMS by the rms.13
Mixed Duopoly. From Table 1, (FMS, FMS) is an equilibrium if
(i) 1;1   1;2  0 for rm 1 and (ii) 2;1   2;3  0 for rm 2. The rst
condition yields
a2(3 + 2)
(5 + 2)2
  3a
2
50
  s  0
which implies a corresponding critical value for s denoted;
2 =
a2f2()
50(5 + 2)2
(8)
where f2() = 75 + 40   122 > 0. The second condition is equivalent to
2a2(8 + 5 + 2)
(1 + )(5 + 2)2
  2a
2(61  58   122 + 163)
(15  82)2   s  0
implying an associated critical value for s,
3 =
2a2f3()
(1 + )(5 + 2)2(82   15)2 (9)
where f3 () = 275   170   2492 + 883 + 724   165 > 0: It is easy
to establish that @2=@a > 0; @3=@a > 0; @2=@ < 0 and @3=@ <
0. A larger market (higher a) supports a larger critical di¤erence in the
xed costs of the two di¤erent types of technology while increased product
substitutability (higher ) has the opposite e¤ect. Taking the two conditions
together implies that (FMS, FMS) is an equilibrium when s < 2 and s < 3
while it is not an equilibrium if s > 2 or s > 3. We then state the following
Lemma14:
Lemma 1 : In the mixed duopoly, (FMS, FMS) is an equilibrium if s <
minf2; 3g: In particular, given market size a; there exists a critical value
 such that for  <  (FMS, FMS) is an equilibrium if s < 2 and for
13Röller and Tombak (1990, 1993) obtain a similar result for a di¤erent specication of
the variable production costs.
14All proofs are included in the Appendix.
8
 >  (FMS, FMS) is an equilibrium if s < 3: This critical value is
 = 0:2432.
This result implies that under low levels of competition the private rm
is less likely to have a multiproduct prole than the public rm (2 < 3
for  < ). On the other hand, the opposite happens for high degrees of
competition (2 > 3 for  > ).15 Having analyzed both the private and
mixed duopoly cases we now proceed to a simple comparison of the two
regimes. First, we consider the conditions for an (FMS, FMS) equilibrium
to occur, i.e. we compare the three critical levels of xed costs, 1; 2 and
3 (see expressions (7),(8) and (9)). The following proposition describes.
Proposition 1 For given  2 [0; 1) and any a > 0 the critical value for
the xed technology costs s is lower in the mixed duopoly than in the private
duopoly, that is minf2; 3g < 1. Hence from the necessary conditions
for an (FMS, FMS) equilibrium, (7),(8) and (9):
(i) if s < minf2; 3g then (FMS, FMS) is an equilibrium in both the
mixed and private duopolies;
(ii) if minf2; 3g < s < 1 then (FMS, FMS) is an equilibrium in the
private duopoly but not in the mixed duopoly;
(iii) if 1 < s then (FMS, FMS) is not an equilibrium.
Proposition 1 implies that an equilibrium in (FMS, FMS) is more likely
to arise in a private duopoly than in a mixed duopoly (i.e. it requires less
demanding conditions of the technology costs and size of the market). Even
if this result might seem surprising, the intuition behind it is clear. First,
consider the case with relatively high substitutability between products. In
such a case, the public rms is less inclined to invest in FMS since it is less
protable and also socially not meaningful: investing in FMS would imply
bearing the higher technology costs in order to produce a new good which
is perceived by consumers to be a very close substitute to the one already
15Note that this result is conrmed empirically by Schlesinger et al. (1997) and
Schlesinger et al. (1998), in the context of competition among hospitals in the provi-
sion of several services.
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produced by the public rm.16 Second, consider the case of relatively low
substitutability. Here, the public rm produces more in each market to
compensate for the low substitutability between products, therefore making
it less protable for the private rm to invest in technology adoption; in
essence the public rm crowds out the private rms investment.
Proposition 1 is illustrated in gure 1. The gure graphs 1; 2; 3
for given a. 17 The area below 1 represents combinations of s and 
that guarantee an (FMS, FMS) equilibrium in the private duopoly and the
area below the minimum of 2 and 3 represents equivalent combinations
for the mixed duopoly. Therefore, the shadowed area represents parameter
combinations that make (FMS, FMS) an equilibrium in the private but
not the mixed duopoly. This indicates that, for given size of the market
and product di¤erentiation, lower values of the technology adoption costs
correspond to an (FMS, FMS) equilibrium in the mixed duopoly.
[Insert gure 1 about here]
3.2 The (DE, DE) Equilibrium
Private Duopoly. In the case of the private duopoly the conditions for
(DE, DE) to be an equilibrium (see Table 1) are (i) 1;4   1;3 > 0 and (ii)
2;4   2;2 > 0, for rms 1 and 2 respectively, implying
  3a
2
2(3 + )2
+
a2(300  276   852 + 1223   214)
2(24  112)2 + s  0:
Letting 4 denote the relevant critical value for s in this case, we obtain
from the above expression,
4 =
a2f4()
2(3 + )2(112   24)2 (10)
16 In such a case, it would be more e¢ cient to produce a higher quantity of the "old"
good instead.
17We have set a = 1 in gure 1. The value of a does not a¤ect the graphs qualitatively,
since a is just a scaling parameter.
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where f4() = 972  684   5372 + 3123 + 954   45   216 > 0. If s is
greater than this critical value, 4; then (DE, DE) is an equilibrium. It is
obvious that this critical value is increasing in market size, @4=@a > 0, while
it can be easily established that it is decreasing in the product di¤erentiation
parameter, @4=@ < 0. Consequently, (DE, DE) is an equilibrium for
relatively smaller a and higher . The intuition behind this is clear, since the
opposite to the FMS case holds: The smaller the market for either product
makes rms less willing to participate in exible technology adoption in
order to serve both markets. With a high degree of substitutability (high
) rmsproducts are perceived as close substitutes by consumers so that a
rm that opts for a FMS is bearing a high xed cost to produce two goods
that are almost the same. Hence a smaller market size and lower product
di¤erentiation point towards the adoption of DE by the rms, given s.
Mixed Duopoly. From Table 1, the conditions ensuring that (DE,
DE) is an equilibrium are (i) 1;4   1;3 > 0 (for the private rm) and (ii)
2;4   2;2 > 0 (for the public rm). The rst condition can be written as
3a2(2  )2
8(2   3)2  
a2(51  48   142 + 163)
(15  82)2 + s  0
implying that the associated critical value for s is
5 =
a2f5()
8(2   3)2(82   15)2 (11)
where f5() = 972 756 12512+5763+10324 3845 3046+1287 >
0. From the second condition we obtain
a2( 57 + 60   42)
100( 1 + 2)  
a2(17  14   2 + 23)
4( 3 + 2)2 + s  0
with associated critical value
6 =
a2f6()
50(2   3)2(1  2) (12)
where f6() = 44   95 + 722   203 + 44   55 + 26 > 0. Notice
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that @5=@a > 0 and @6=@a > 0 while it is relatively easy to check that
@5=@ < 0 and @6=@ S 0 as  S 0:6669. Therefore a (DE, DE)
equilibrium occurs when both s > 5 and s > 6. The following Lemma
establishes that the latter inequality is su¢ cient for a (DE, DE) equilibrium;
that is, the critical value in the mixed duopoly is the one corresponding to
the public rm.
Lemma 2 : In the mixed duopoly (DE, DE) is an equilibrium if s > 6 for
all  2 [0; 1).
In line with the discussion of the (FMS, FMS) equilibrium we now pro-
ceed in comparing the private and mixed duopolies in terms of the critical
values for the di¤erence in xed costs as well as characterizing the (DE, DE)
equilibrium.
Lemma 3 Comparing the critical values for the private duopoly, 4, and
the mixed duopoly, 6, we have: 4  6 for 1    2 and 4 < 6 for
0   < 1 and 2 <  < 1; where 1 = 0:0056 and 2 = 0:6755.
We summarize the results obtained in this subsection in the following
proposition:
Proposition 2(a) For given a > 0 and 1    2 : (i) if s > 4 then
(DE, DE) is an equilibrium in both the mixed and private duopolies, (ii) if
4 > s > 6 then (DE, DE) is an equilibrium in the mixed duopoly but not
in the private duopoly, (iii) if 6 > s then (DE, DE) is not an equilibrium;
(b) For given a > 0, 0 <  < 1 and 2 <  < 1 : (i) if s > 6 then
(DE, DE) is an equilibrium in both the mixed and the private duopolies, (ii)
if 6 > s > 4 then (DE, DE) is an equilibrium in the private but not the
mixed duopoly, (iii) if 4 > s then (DE, DE) is not an equilibrium.
Figure 2 illustrates proposition 2.18 The white area above 4 and 6
represents combinations of the parameters s and  such that a (DE, DE)
equilibrium exists for both versions of duopoly. The dark shadowed area
18 In Figure 2, a = 1.
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represents combinations that guarantee a (DE, DE) equilibrium in the pri-
vate duopoly but not in the mixed one. Finally, the light shadowed area
represents parameter combinations that make (DE, DE) an equilibrium in
the mixed duopoly only.
[Insert Figure 2 about here]
Figure 2 illustrates that the necessary conditions for a (DE, DE) equi-
librium are more stringent in the case of the mixed duopoly for low and
relatively high values of substitutability. For low values of substitutabil-
ity, i.e. when products are perceived as highly di¤erentiated by consumers,
there is a strong incentive for the public rm to serve both markets and so
increase the degree of competition. Thus, a (DE, DE) equilibrium is less
likely in the mixed duopoly. For high values of substitutability, since the
degree of competition across markets is already very high, either rm in the
private duopoly is willing to adopt DE as a way of dampening down compe-
tition, provided that its counterpart behaves in the same way. Meanwhile,
in the case of the mixed duopoly, if the private rm uses DE, the public
rm has strong incentives to adopt FMS in order to increase the degree of
competition. For intermediate values of product substitutability a (DE, DE)
equilibrium is more prevalent in the mixed duopoly.
3.3 The (DE, FMS) and (FMS, DE) Equilibria
Private Duopoly. From Table 1, (DE, FMS) is an equilibrium when (i)
1;1  1;2  0 for rm 1 and (ii) 2;4  2;3 > 0 for rm 2. The two
conditions taken together imply that if 1 < s < 4, (DE, FMS) is a Nash
equilibrium in the case of a private duopoly. Given symmetry, it follows
that (FMS, DE) is an equilibrium under the same conditions as (DE, FMS).
Thus, if 1 < s < 4 there are two Nash Equilibria. We then state the
following lemma.
Lemma 4 In the private duopoly, (DE, FMS) and (FMS, DE) are Nash
Equilibria if 1 < s < 4: In particular, given market size a, there exists a
critical value  such that if  >  then 4 > 1 and therefore, (DE,
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FMS) and (DE, FMS) are Nash Equilibria: This critical value is  =
0:6442:
It is interesting to note that only relatively high values of product sub-
stitutability guarantee the existence of asymmetric equilibria (in the sense
that rms make di¤ering technology choices).19 Intuitively, when there is
high substitutability across markets, there are situations in which technol-
ogy costs are high enough to make unprotable the investment in FMS when
the opponent is present in the two markets while they are not high enough
to make the investment unprotable when the counterpart is only present
in one of the two markets. In such circumstances, the equilibrium outcome
will be asymmetric.20
Mixed Duopoly. We begin with the analysis of the (DE, FMS) equi-
librium. In this case, from Table 1, the necessary conditions are (i) 1;1 
1;2  0 and (ii) 2;4  2;2 < 0 implying that if 2 < s < 6, (DE, FMS) is
a Nash Equilibrium in the mixed duopoly.
Lemma 5 (DE, FMS) is a Nash equilibrium in the mixed duopoly only if
2 < s < 6. This is satised for values of the substitutability parameter
  0:3133 or   0:8172. For  2 (0:3133; 0:8172); (DE, FMS) is not an
equilibrium.
Next we consider the case of the (FMS, DE) equilibrium. So that (FMS,
DE) is an equilibrium it is required that (i) 1;4  1;3 > 0 and (ii) 2;3 
2;1 > 0, implying that 3 < s < 5 must hold.
Lemma 6 (FMS, DE) is a Nash equilibrium in the mixed duopoly if 3 <
s < 5: In particular, given market size, a;there exists a critical value 
19This result is in contrast with Kim, Röller and Tombak (1992) where asymmetric
equilibria in pure strategies do not exist.
20Here the two rms are interested in being the one using FMS. Given that 1;2 
1;1 > 0 and 

1;3  1;4 > 0 must hold, and by denition 1;4 > 1;2 (8 6= 0), then
1;3 > 

1;2. Given the symmetry of the game, the same applies to rm 2. Therefore, in
the case of asymmetric equilibria the rm using FMS obtains higher prots than the one
using DE. Therefore, given the multiplicity of equilibria rms might end up in the worst
scenario possible unless some coordination mechanism is used.
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such that for  >  (FMS, DE) is an equilibrium: This critical value is
 = 0:3133:
Interestingly, we can show that given a set of market and technology
conditions (a, s and ), asymmetric equilibria never arise simultaneously in
the private and in the mixed duopoly. In other words, the space of market
and technology conditions required for an asymmetric equilibrium to arise
in the private duopoly does not overlap with any of the two (one for (FMS,
DE), the other for (DE, FMS)) spaces of market and technology conditions
required in the mixed duopoly.
Proposition 3 (i) For given a > 0 and  >  if 1 < s < 4
(FMS, DE) and (DE, FMS) are equilibria in the private duopoly but not
in the mixed duopoly; (ii) For given a > 0 and  =2 (0:313292; 0:817226) if
2 < s < 6 then (DE, FMS) is an equilibrium in the mixed duopoly but not
in the private duopoly; (iii) For given a > 0 and  >  if 3 < s < 5
then (FMS, DE) is an equilibrium in the mixed duopoly but not in the private
duopoly.
4 Is Privatization Benecial?
In this section, we examine social welfare across the two market arrange-
ments. In doing so address the question of privatization of the public rm.
Obviously, privatization is benecial only if it leads to an increase in social
welfare (total surplus).
Note that under the same market and technology conditions, the tech-
nology choice equilibrium outcomes of the mixed and the private duopoly
might di¤er, as shown in Propositions 1 to 3. Therefore, in order to make
a valid comparison across types of duopoly, we need to identify the equilib-
rium outcomes of the two duopolies for given sets of market and technology
conditions. We proceed as follows: We start by considering one of the
four possible equilibria in the mixed duopoly, say (FMS, FMS). We know
that this equilibrium requires a particular set of conditions related to the
parameters of the model, s, a and  (as established in Lemma 1). Then
15
we identify which would be the corresponding equilibrium outcome in the
private duopoly under the same set of market and technology conditions.
Having done this, we compare the equilibrium level of total surplus across
the two regimes. We, then, repeat this procedure for the other three possible
equilibria in the mixed duopoly (DE, FMS), (FMS, DE) and (DE, DE). We
denote by subscripts M the mixed duopoly and by P the private duopoly,
followed by 1, 2, 3 and 4 denoting the (FMS, FMS), (DE, FMS), (FMS, DE)
and (DE, DE) equilibria respectively.
4.1 (FMS, FMS) Equilibrium in the mixed duopoly
Recall From Lemma 1 that (FMS, FMS) is an equilibrium in the mixed
duopoly if s < minf2; 3g. The equivalent condition for the private duopoly
is s < 1 while from Proposition 1 the critical value for the xed technology
costs s is lower in the mixed duopoly than in the private one, minf2; 3g <
1. So (FMS, FMS) is an equilibrium in both the mixed and private
duopolies if s < minf2; 3g. A straightforward comparison of the total
surplus in the two market regimes reveals that welfare is higher in the pri-
vate duopoly except when products are nearly independent, as the following
Lemma demonstrates.
Lemma 7 TSP1  TSM1 for   0:0223 and TSP1 < TSM1 for  <
0:0223:
4.2 (DE, DE) Equilibrium in the mixed duopoly
As shown in lemma 3, the relevant condition for a (DE, DE) equilibrium in
the mixed duopoly is s > 6 while the equivalent condition in the private
duopoly requires s > 4. We then distinguish the following cases. Case A:
s > 6 and s > 4. (DE, DE) is the outcome in both market arrangements.
Case B(i): s > 6, s < 4 and s  1 . (DE, DE) obtains in the mixed
duopoly while either (DE, FMS) or (FMS, DE) occurs in the private duopoly;
Case B(ii): s > 6; s < 4 and s < 1 where (DE, DE) is the mixed duopoly
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equilibrium and (FMS, FMS) is the private duopoly equilibrium. We next
proceed to examine each of these cases in detail.
Case A. (DE, DE) is the equilibrium in both the mixed and private
duopolies so we just need to compare TSP4 and TSM4 . This is done in the
following Lemma.
Lemma 8 For a > 0 and  2 [0; 1); when s > 6 and s > 4, TSP4 < TSM4
.
Case B(i). The mixed duopoly is characterized by a (DE, DE) equilib-
rium while the private duopoly equilibrium is either (DE, FMS) or (FMS,
DE). Hence the relevant welfare comparison is between total surplus TSM4 in
the mixed duopoly and total surplus TSP2 in the private duopoly - recall
that the private duopoly equilibria are symmetric. The following lemma 9
illustrates.
Lemma 9 For a > 0 and  2 (0:6442; 0:6755); when s > 6, s < 4 and
s  1; TSP2 < TSM4 :
Case B(ii). In this case the mixed duopoly equilibrium is (DE, DE)
while the private duopoly yields (FMS, FMS). In the following lemma, we
compare total surpluses TSM4 and TSP1 .
Lemma 10 For a > 0 and  2 (0:0536; 0:6736); when s > 6, s < 4 and
s < 1, TSP1 < TSM4 :
To sum up the results of this section, under the market and technology
conditions that lead to an equilibrium with both rms choosing DE in the
mixed duopoly, privatization will not be welfare enhancing.
4.3 (DE, FMS) Equilibrium in the mixed duopoly
Next we turn our attention to the (DE, FMS) equilibrium in the mixed
duopoly. From Lemma 5, the relevant condition for a (DE, FMS) equilibrium
is 2 < s < 6 and is satised when  =2 (0:3133; 0:8173). In this ranges of
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values for , the corresponding equilibrium in the private duopoly would be
either (DE, DE), if s > 4 (Case C) or (FMS, FMS) if s < 1 (Case D).21
We start by analyzing the rst of these cases.
Case C : 2 < s < 6 and s > 4. (DE, FMS) is the outcome in the
mixed duopoly while (DE, DE) obtains in the private duopoly. Comparing
total surplus in the two market regimes yields the following Lemma.
Lemma 11 For a > 0 and  =2 (0:0056; 0:8173) when 2 < s < 6 and
s > 4, TSP4 < TSM2 :
Case D : 2 < s < 6 and s < 1. (DE, FMS) is the outcome in the
mixed duopoly and (FMS, FMS) in the private one. The relevant welfare
comparison is between TSP1 and TSM2 .
Lemma 12 For a > 0 and  =2 (0:3133; 0:8173); when 2 < s < 6 and
s < 1, TSP1 < TSM2 :
In both cases, privatization would not be benecial. Therefore, under
the market and technology conditions that lead to an equilibrium in the
mixed duopoly with the private rm adopting DE and the public rm FMS,
privatization is welfare reducing.
4.4 (FMS, DE) Equilibrium in the mixed duopoly
Finally, we consider the case of the (FMS, DE) equilibrium in the mixed
duopoly. Lemma 6 requires that 3 < s < 5; which is guaranteed as long
as  >  = 0:3133. In Proposition 3 we have shown that asymmetric
equilibria do not arise in both types of duopoly for a given set of technology
and market conditions. Moreover, it can be easily checked that 4 > 5 and
thus, (DE, DE) is never an equilibrium in the private duopoly for values of s
such that 3 < s < 5:On the contrary, the conditions for (FMS, FMS) to be
an equilibrium in the private duopoly are compatible with 3 < s < 5, since
21 In proposition 3 we have shown that asymmetric equilibria do not arise in both types
of duopoly.
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1 > 5 . Hence, whenever the equilibrium in the mixed duopoly is (FMS,
DE) the counterpart in the private duopoly is (FMS, FMS). Therefore, the
only comparison that is meaningful here is between TSP1 and TSM3 .
Lemma 13 For a > 0 and  2 [0; 1), when 3 < s < 5 and s < 1 ,
TSP1 < TSM3 :
As a consequence, we can state that under the conditions that lead to an
equilibrium in the mixed duopoly with the private rm using FMS and the
public rm using DE, privatization would not lead to an increase in surplus.
The results we have obtained regarding welfare comparisons across the
two market arrangements have some potential policy implications for the
debate about the privatization of a public rm. As we have argued and
shown, privatizing the public rm, i.e. switching from a mixed duopoly to
a private one, would only enhance social welfare when the outcome in the
mixed duopoly is (FMS, FMS), i.e. both rms are adopting exibility in
their production, provided that products are not (almost) independent. The
private duopoly outcome would also be (FMS, FMS) but would result in
higher levels of social welfare. In all other cases, privatization would result
in a reduction in social welfare. The following Proposition summarizes.
Proposition 4: Privatization is benecial in that it increases social
welfare when the equilibrium outcome in the mixed duopoly is (FMS, FMS)
and  > 0:0223. In the remaining cases privatization of the public rm is
detrimental as it would reduce social welfare.
The relative strength of the above proposition in terms of its policy im-
plications is derived from the fact that it can be used even without knowing
the exact values of a ,  and s. It seems quite plausible to assume that
policy makers know accurately the strategic plans of public rms, in this
case the FMS investment plan in technology choice and the closeness be-
tween the markets/goods. If the public rm does not have any intention
of replacing DE with FMS, then privatizing it should not be considered.
However, a word of caution is needed here. The results we obtain are based
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on a simple duopoly model, with linear demand and quadratic costs. It
would be interesting to examine the robustness of the models predictions in
a more general setting of an oligopoly with general demand and cost func-
tions and also whether the results are sensitive to the mode of competition,
i.e. quantity versus price. We leave this aside for future research.
5 Concluding Remarks
In this paper we have introduced a mixed duopoly in the context of a dif-
ferentiated product, quantity-setting duopoly facing the decision of whether
to adopt a exible technology (and become a multiproduct or multimarket
rm) or a dedicated technology. We have also the equivalent private duopoly
so as to compare the outcomes of the two di¤erent market arrangements and
provide some tentative policy guidelines on the privatization of a public rm.
Our main ndings can be summarized as follows: An equilibrium with
both rms choosing exible technologies is more likely to arise in the case of
the private duopoly. Further, an equilibrium involving the two rms using
dedicated technologies is also more likely to arise in the private duopoly
when products are very close substitutes or almost independent. Mixed
(asymmetric) equilibria with one rm being exible and the other dedicated,
are less likely to be obtained in the private duopoly. In the case of a mixed
duopoly, the public rm chooses a dedicated technology when products are
very close substitutes, since it is not protable f to bear higher technology
costs in order to produce almost the same good.
Privatization of the public rm is warranted, i.e., benecial, when the
market and technology conditions lead to an equilibrium outcome where
both rms use exible technologies and goods are not (almost) independent.
The underlying conditions for this equilibrium to arise imply high potential
protability (low technology costs relative to the size of the market and/or
the degree of substitutability between markets). In all remaining cases,
privatizing the public rm would result in a reduction of social welfare.
Thus, our results provide limited support for privatizing the public rm.
However, this conclusion is qualied by the limitations of the model used.
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6 Appendix
6.1 Private duopoly: Equilibrium solutions
(FMS, FMS) Firm 1 Firm 2
 a
2(3+2)
(4+3)2
  (1 + s) a2(3+2)
(4+3)2
  (1 + s)
TS 2a
2(5+2)
(4+3)2
  2(1 + s)
(DE, DE) Firm 1 Firm 2
 3a
2
2(3+)2
  1 3a2
2(3+)2
  1
TS 4a
2
(3+)2
  2
(FMS, DE) Firm 1 Firm 2
 a(300 (3 )(92+(59 21))
24 112   (1 + s) 3a
2(6  22)2
2(24 112)2   1
TS a
2(2+)(154 (215 (81 4)))
(24 112)2   (2 + s)
(DE, FMS) Firm 1 Firm 2
 3a
2(6  22)2
2(24 112)2   1 a(300 (3 )(92+(59 21))24 112   (1 + s)
TS a
2(2+)(154 (215 (81 4)))
(24 112)2   (2 + s)
6.2 Mixed duopoly: Equilibrium solutions
(FMS, FMS) Private Firm Public Firm
 a
2(3+2)2
(5+2)2
  (1 + s) 4a2(1+3+2)
(1+)(5+2)2
  (1 + s)
TS 2a
2(8+(5+))
(1+)(5+2)2
  2(1 + s)
(DE, DE) Private Firm Public Firm
 3a
2(2 )2
8(3 2)2   1 a
2(9 22(5 2))
8(3 2)2   1
TS a
2(17 (14+(1 2)))
4(3 2)2   2
(FMS, DE) Private Firm Public Firm
 a
2(51 48 142+163)
(15 82)2   (1 + s) a
2(18+2(3 2(9 4))
(15 82)2   1
TS 2a
2(61 2(29+2(3 4))
(15 82)2   (2 + s)
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(DE, FMS) Private Firm Public Firm
 3a
2
50   1 a
2(41 2(143 20(6 ))
200(1 2)2   (1 + s)
TS a
2(57 4(15 ))
100(1 2)   (2 + s)
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6.3 Proofs
Proof of Lemma 1: Note that @2=@ < 0; and @3=@ < 0: Further,
from (8) and (9), we obtain 2 j=0= 0:06a2 , 2 j!1= 0:042a2, 3 j=0=
0:0977a2 , 3 j!1= 0 and 3 j=0> 2 j=0 while 2 j!1> 3 j!1= 0.
Therefore 2 and 3 must cross. Setting (8) and (9) equal we obtain
 = 0:2432 where 2 and 3 cross. The result then follows immediately.
QED
Proof of Proposition 1 Lemma 1 establishes that the relevant critical
value for s in the mixed duopoly is minf2; 3g; in particular, for  < 
the relevant critical value is given by 2 and for    it is given by
3,  = 0:2432: Thus, we need to show that 2 < 1 for  <  and
3 < 1 for   : Note that @1=@ < 0; @2=@ < 0, @3=@ < 0:
Further, from (7) and (8), we obtain 1 j=0= 0:0937a2 and 2 j=0= 0:06a2
respectively. 1 = 2 at  = 0:4593 >  and 2 j=0< 1 j=0 : Therefore,
2 < 1 when  < . Similarly, from (7) and (9) we obtain 1 j!1=
0:0221a2, and 3 j!1= 0 respectively. 1 = 3 at  = 0:0393 <  and
3 j!1< 1 j!1 : Therefore, 3 < 1 when    and we have shown
that minf2; 3g < 1. The rest of the proposition follows by considering
the conditions for the (FMS, FMS) equilibrium, i.e. conditions (7), (8) and
(9) QED
Proof of Lemma 2 From (11) and (12), 6 5 = a
2f5;6()
200(2 3)2(2 1)(82 15)2 :
This is positive as f5;6() < 0; where f5;6() =  15300+66600 781352 
399003 + 1113314
 143805   497926 + 131207 + 84968   19209   51210 ; and the
denominator is negative as lim!1  < 0. QED
Proof of Lemma 3 Note that 4 j=0= 0:0937a2 , 6 j=0= 0:0978a2
, 4 j=1= 0:0246a2 and lim!1 6 = 1. Therefore, 4 j=0< 6 j=0
and 4 j=1< lim!1 6 = 1. 6 reaches its minimum at  = 0:6689
while 4 j=0:6689= 0:0393a2 and 6 j=0:6689= 0:0388a2, meaning that
4 j=0:6689> 6 j=0:6689 : Hence, 4 and 6 must cross twice: setting
4 and 6 equal, we nd that they cross at 1 = 0:0056 and at 2 = 0:6755:
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The rest of the lemma follows.QED
Proof of Proposition 2 Follows from Lemma 3 and the necessary
conditions for equilibrium, i.e. conditions (7), (8) and (9). QED
Proof of Lemma 4Using (7) and (10) we obtain 1 4 = a
2f1;4()
2(3+)2(4+3)2(24 112)2
where f1;4() = 576+ 168   16082  4883+6464  206+817 R 0 for
 R  = 0:6442: The rest of the lemma follows immediately. QED
Proof of Lemma 5 Note that 6 j=0= 0:1a2 , 2 j=0= 0:06a2 ;
6 j!1=1 ; and 2 j!1= 0:042a2: Further, @2=@ < 0 and @6=@ Q 0
for  Q 0:6669. Setting 2 and 6 equal, we nd that they cross at
 = 0:3133 and at  = 0:8172: It is then obvious that 2 < 6 when
  0:3133 and when   0:8172 and 2 > 6 when  2 (0:3133; 0:8172):
The rest of the lemma follows from the equilibrium conditions. QED
Proof of Lemma 6 @3=@ < 0 and @5=@ < 0: Furthermore, 3 j=0=
0:0977a2, 3 j!1= 0, 5 j=0= 0:06a2 and 5 j!1= 0:0083a2;so that
3 j=0> 5 j=0= 0:06a2 while 3 j!1= 0 < 5 j!1 : Therefore, 5 and
3 cross at a critical value of the parameter of substitutability,  = 0:3133:
Thus, if   ; 5  3 and if  > ; 5 > 3: The rest of the lemma
follows from equilibrium conditions (9) and (11).QED
Proof of Proposition 3 As shown in lemma 4, for (DE, FMS) or
(FMS, DE) to be equilibria in the private duopoly 1 < s < 4 must hold;
this can only happen for  >  = 0:644205: Recall that (DE, FMS) is an
equilibrium in the mixed duopoly if 2 < s < 6. We know that @2=@ < 0
and @4=@ < 0 and that 2 j=0= 0:06a2, 2 j!1= 0:042a2, 4 j=0=
0:9375a2, 4 j!1= 0:02459a2. Therefore, 2 j=0< 4 j=0 while 2 j!1>
4 j!1 :Thus, they must cross at a certain value of . Setting 2 and
4equal, we know that 2 Q 4 for  Q 0:450595: Therefore for  > ,
2 > 4, implying that 1 < s < 4 and 2 < s < 6 can not hold
simultaneously. Furthermore, recall that (FMS, DE) is an equilibrium in the
mixed duopoly if 3 < s < 5. We know that @1=@ < 0 and @5=@ <
0 and that 1 j=0= 0:09375a2, 5 j=0= 0:06a2; 1 j!1= 0:06a2 and
5 j!1= 0:009328a2: Thus, 1 > 5 for any  and therefore 1 < s < 4
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and 3 < s < 5. The rest of the proposition follows.QED
Proof of Lemma 7 TSP1 TSM1 = 2a
2fP1M1 ()
(1+)2(5+2)2(4+3)2
where fP1;M1() =
 3 + 128 + 2772 + 2093 + 674 + 85 Q 0 for  Q 0:0223: Hence,
TSP1  TSM1 if   0:0223 and TSP1 < TSM1 if  < 0:0223.QED
Proof of Lemma 8 TSP4   TSM4 = a
2(1 )2fp4M4 ()
4(3+)2(3 2)2 where fP4S4() =
( 9 + 6 + 2   23) < 0 for any : Hence TSP4 < TSM4 : QED
Proof of Lemma 9 From Lemma 4, 1 < 4 if and only if  >  =
0:6442. Further, from Lemma 3, 6   4 < 0 if and only if 0:0056 <  <
0:6755. Hence the relevant range for  is  2 (0:6442; 0:6755). It can be
checked that the di¤erence TSP2   TSM4 is decreasing in s and TSP2  
TSM4 js=1= a
2fP2M4 ()
4(4+3)2(3 2)2(24 112)2 > 0 as fP2M4() =  10368  4032+
306002+98163 294664 67725+122036+16707 20418 1109+
7210 > 0 for  2 (0:6442; 0:6755): Note also that in this region of ; 1 > 6.
Then, given that s  1, it follows that TSP2 < TSM4 :QED
Proof of Lemma 10 From (7) and (12) 1 6 = a
2f1;6()
50(4+3)2(3 2)2(24 112)2(1 2)
and sign(1   6) = signf1;6(), where f1;6() =  16704 + 332064  
3433562   7444203 + 7066634 + 6342925   5317056
 2521337+1806298+449289  2477910  256311+52212 . Note
that f1;6() > 0 for  2 (0:0536; 0:6736), which is the relevant range for .
It can be checked that the di¤erence TSP1   TSP4 is decreasing in s and
TSP1   TSM4 js=6= a
2fP1M4 ()
100(4+3)2(3 2)2(1 2) < 0 as fP1M4() = 616  
856 + 2972 + 6623   1224   565   1836   387 + 728 < 0: Then,
given that s > 6 it follows that, in the relevant region of , TSP1 TSM4 <
0:QED.
Proof of Lemma 11 From Lemma 3, 4 < 6 if and only if  =2
(0:0056; 0:8173) and from Lemma 5, 2 < 6 if and only if  =2 (0:3133; 0:8173)
so the relevant range for  is  =2 (0:0056; 0:8173). It can be checked that
the di¤erence TSP4   TSM2 is increasing in s; further
TSP2   TSM4 js=6= a
2fP4M2 ()
100(3+)2(3 2)2(1 2)2 < 0 as fP4M2() =  225 +
600  46672+6323+63814  4145  29016+1327+4168  149 
410 < 0. Then, given that s < 6 it follows that, in the relevant region of
27
, TSP2 < TSM4 :QED
Proof of Lemma 12 From Lemma 5, 2 < 6 if and only if  =2
(0:3133; 0:8173) . Further, from the proof of Proposition 1, 2 < 1 if and
only if  < 0:4593: Therefore the relevant range for  is  =2 (0:3133; 0:8173).
It can be checked that the di¤erence TSP1   TSM2 is decreasing in s. Then
TSP1   TSM2 js=2 = a
2fP1M2 ()
100(5+2)2(4+3)2(1 2)2 < 0 as fP1M2() =  200  
3320 263192 220563+160204+232645+85386+14567+2168 < 0
. Hence, given that s > 2 it follows that, in the relevant range for ,
TSP1 < TSM2 .QED
Proof of Lemma 13 It can be checked that the di¤erence TSP1 TSM3
is decreasing in s. Then, TSP1   TSM3 js=3=  a
2fP1M3 ()
(1+)(5+2)2(4+3)2
< 0 as
fP1M3() = 3  3   22 + 3 + 4 > 0: Hence, given that s > 3 it follows
that TSP1 < TSM3 :QED
Proof of Proposition 4 Follows from lemmata 7-13. QED
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Figure 2: (DE, DE) Equilibrium 
 
 
Figure 1: (FMS, FMS) Equilibrium 
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